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ABSTRACT
This study examines auditor changes following
events adversely affecting auditor credibility.
Disciplinary actions against auditors by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) are posited to be events
damaging to auditor credibility.

Agency theory and prior

research are used to generate hypotheses about differences
between client firms that switch auditors and client firms
that do not switch auditors after an SEC action under Rule
2(e) against their auditor.
A series of univariate and multivariate
statistical tests are conducted on the sample firms.

The

sample is divided into a Switch group and a Non-Switch
group.

The sample as a whole is examined, as well as

subgroups of clients of Big Eight auditors and clients of
smaller auditors.
The results indicate that smaller firms are more
likely to switch auditors after an SEC Rule 2(e) action
than larger firms.

Among clients of Big Eight auditors,

firms with a faster rate of sales growth are more likely
to switch auditors.

Contrary to expectations derived from

prior research, firms with audit committees are less

vii

likely to switch auditors than firms without audit
committees.

Among clients of smaller auditors, firms with

management bonus plans tied to audited accounting data are
less likely to switch auditors than firms without such
compensation plans, a result opposite that predicted by
agency theory.
Other than the differences noted between clients
of Big Eight auditors and clients of smaller auditors, the
most striking result of the study is the apparent failure
of agency theory to predict the response of client firms
to a decline in auditor credibility.

viii

CHAPTER 1
OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY
An audit of a firm's financial statements by an
external auditor provides users of the financial
statements with some degree of assurance about their
accuracy and reliability.

Descriptions of the market for

audit services suggest that this level of assurance is
tied to the credibility of the external auditor, and that
credibility varies across auditors.

The demand for

auditor credibility also varies across the firms
purchasing audit services (Dopuch and Simunic 1982;
DeAngelo 1981).— The level of auditor credibility demanded
by a firm will be a factor in the firm's choice of an
external auditor.
Largely unexplored in the accounting literature are
the consequences of changes in auditor credibility.

For

example, the factors that affect the reaction of client
firms when the credibility of their external auditor
changes are unknown.

This research seeks to examine the

reaction of client firms to a change in the credibility of
their external auditor, and to identify the firm
characteristics that affect that reaction.

1

Demand for Credibility
Agency theory postulates that the self-interest of
corporate managers can diverge from the self-interest of
the owners of the firm.

The financial statements of the

firm provide owners with a means of monitoring the
performance of managers.

Wallace (1980) points out that

skeptical owners will make management bear the cost of any
perceived risk of loss due to misleading or fraudulent
financial statements.

Thus, managers have an incentive to

provide some assurance to owners that the financial
statements are free of material fraud or error.

The audit

of the financial statements by an external auditor
provides that assurance.

As Dopuch and Simunic (1982,

407) note:
Stockholders will rationally expect that attestation
by a credible auditor reduces the probability that
management is able to successfully conceal 'self
serving behavior.'
If a credible audit increases owners' confidence that no
self-serving behavior by management is being concealed,
then it should also increase their confidence that
management's activities are more aligned with the owners'
interests, and more likely to increase the firm's expected
future cash flows.

Attestation of the firm's financial

statements by a credible auditor should thus increase the
value of the firm.

Dopuch and Simunic (1982) note that

management's wealth will increase to the extent that
compensation is tied to the value of the firm.
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In determining what level of auditor credibility to
"purchase," firm management must balance the benefits of a
credible audit discussed against its costs.

The chief

cost to management of a credible audit will be the utility
of self-serving behavior foregone.

The point where the

marginal benefit of a credible audit equals the marginal
cost will vary across firms.

DeAngelo (1981, 185) states:

Differential agency costs across firms and over time
for a given firm imply a heterogeneous demand for
audit services, i.e., differing 'levels* of auditing
are demanded.
Also, Francis and Wilson (1988, 663) note that "it follows
that when agency costs are greater there is increased
demand for higher-level audit quality."
Assessment of Credibility
Unlike consumers of most other goods, users of
audited financial statements have no means of directly
assessing the quality of the product.

Financial statement

users do not directly observe audit procedures and have
little information about the contractual arrangements, and
resulting incentives, that may exist between the auditor
and the client firm (DeAngelo 1981).

Unable to directly

assess audit quality, users develop observable proxies
that are associated with audit quality.

DeAngelo (1981)

proposed auditor size as a surrogate for audit quality.
Another potential proxy is the reputation of the audit
firm.

Dopuch and Simunic (1982, 408) argue:

Since in the United States the only audit
characteristic disclosed to users today is an
auditor’s identity, credibility must be associated
solely with an auditor's name.
If the only observable indicator of audit quality is
the auditor's name, then it follows that events adversely
affecting the reputation of an audit firm diminish the
perceived quality of audits performed by the firm.

Dopuch

and Simunic (1982, 411) note that "changes in credibility
will . . . derive from public information about auditors."
Wilson and Grimlund (1990) examined actions against public
accounting firms by the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), and found that these actions appeared to adversely
affect auditor credibility.

The nature of these actions

by the SEC is discussed in more detail below.
The SEC and Auditor Credibility
Rule 2(e) of the SEC's Rules of Practice allows the
SEC to impose penalties against auditors who have engaged
in improper or unethical professional conduct, or who have
willfully violated or aided in the violation of federal
securities laws.

Rule 2(e) allows the SEC to prohibit

individuals or firms from practicing before the SEC,
mandate a review of audit procedures by other audit firms,
or prohibit an audit firm from accepting new, publicly
held clients for a specified period of time.

Enforcement

activities resulting from Rule 2(e) are published by the

SEC as part of their Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Releases (AAERs).

Poloway (1987, 516) notes:

. . . [the Rule's] mere existence induces considerable
compliance, particularly in the practice of
accounting, where there is always the danger of
irreparable damage to a professional reputation.
The prohibition against practicing before the SEC and/or
against accepting new clients is an especially powerful
weapon.

Stevens (1981, 211) quotes the general counsel of

an accounting firm as saying "Rule 2 (e) is the atomic bomb
and the SEC has it."
Actions against audit firms by the SEC under Rule
2(e) are uncommon.

Business Week (1984, 132) noted that

"private litigation over audits is commonplace, but the
SEC will step in only if the mistakes are glaring and
frequent."

Descriptive evidence of the consequences of

SEC actions to an auditor's reputation can be found in the
business press.

A case in point is the 1983 action by the

SEC against the audit firm Fox & Co.

An article in the

business press emphasized the effect of the action on Fox
& Co.'s reputation:
U.S. Minerals Exploration Co., . . ., recently
dismissed Fox and went with Price Waterhouse.
"We
were very pleased with Fox's service and fees. But
Fox's problems became our problems," says . . . U.S.
Minerals' president.
"Because of the SEC problem," he
explains, "we started to get some flak from investment
bankers." (Business Week 1984, 133)
Wilson and Grimlund (1990) examined client reaction
to SEC actions under Rule 2(e).

Their results indicated

that an auditor affected by an SEC action tended to lose
market share to its competitors.

Additionally, auditors

involved in SEC actions had more difficulty retaining
clients and attracting new clients than did other
auditors.

The results were consistent with the view that

SEC actions under Rule 2(e) are events that adversely
affect the credibility of audit firms.
Wilson and Grimlund (1990) examined client reaction
subsequent to an SEC action against an auditor.

Their

hypotheses focused on the effects of the SEC action
itself, as opposed to the original audit failure that led
to the SEC action.

Their results, as well as the

descriptive evidence discussed above, support the
conclusion that actions by the SEC under Rule 2(e) are
public events that can adversely affect the credibility of
an audit firm.

However, the issue of changes in auditor

credibility has not been given much attention in the
accounting literature.

Most research to date has treated

auditor credibility as a constant over time.
Research Objectives
This research has two main objectives.

The first is

to identify the factors affecting client firm reaction to
a decline in external auditor credibility.

Second, this

research will attempt to provide some initial insight into
whether the determinants of client reaction to a decline
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in auditor credibility differ between clients of Big Eight
auditors and clients of non-Big Eight auditors.
Wilson and Grimlund (1990) found that SEC actions
under Rule 2(e) appeared to lower auditor credibility.1
The use of such actions as events damaging auditor
credibility allows these objectives to be articulated in
the form of the following research questions:
1.

On what dimensions do firms that switch auditors
after an SEC Rule 2 (e) action against their
external auditor differ from firms that do not
switch auditors after such an action?

2.

Are the differences between firms that switch
auditors and firms that do not switch auditors
after an SEC Rule 2(e) action against their
external auditor similar for clients of Big Eight
auditors and clients of smaller auditors?

Hypotheses derived from agency theory and prior research
will test these research questions.

The data to test the

hypotheses will be drawn from the financial statements and
proxy statements of sample firms.
Research Method
Actions by the SEC against auditors under Rule 2(e)
of the SEC's Rules of Practice will be used as events that
adversely affected the credibility of an auditor.

A

sample of Rule 2(e) actions will be drawn from prior
research and the SEC's Accounting and Auditing Enforcement

1 Although other events may damage auditor
credibility, the study is limited to an examination of SEC
actions under Rule 2(e).

Releases (AAERs).

The clients of auditors cited by the

SEC will be divided into two groups.

One group will

consist of firms that switched auditors within the two
years following the SEC action.2 The other group will
consist of firms that did not switch auditors within the
two year period.3

Client firms that declared bankruptcy

or were acquired by other firms within the two year period
will not be included in the sample.
Both univariate and multivariate tests will be used
to investigate differences between the two groups of
sample firms.

First, the t-statistic will be calculated

and tested for significant differences in the continuous
independent variables.

Because of a lack of prior

knowledge about the distributional characteristics of the
independent variables, the nonparametric Mann-Whitney test
will also be conducted to provide additional assurance

2 A limitation of this approach is that it does not
include clients that anticipate an SEC action and switch
auditors prior to the announcement of the action.
However, the results of Wilson and Grimlund (1990)
indicate a significant client reaction after the
announcement of the SEC action.
3 Some client firms may have entered into multi-year
engagement contracts with their auditor, and thus are
unable to switch auditors within the two year period.
Since information as to the nature of individual
engagement contracts is not publicly available, the
inability of client firms to switch auditors due to
contractual obligations represents a potential confounding
factor in the study. Healy and Lys (1986) also employed a
two year period in their examination of auditor changes
following audit firm mergers.

about the results of the t-tests.

Differences in

dichotomous independent variables will be examined by
means of a Chi-square test for independence of
classification.
The multivariate tests will provide additional
assurance about the univariate test results.

A logistic

regression (logit) model will be employed to determine the
impact of the independent variables on the decision of a
firm to switch auditors following an SEC action against
the firm's auditor.

A statistically significant

coefficient for an independent variable will be
interpreted as evidence that the variable affects the
probability that a firm will switch auditors following an
SEC action against its external auditor.
Expected Contribution
This research will provide additional insight into
the nature of the demand for auditor credibility.

Dopuch

and Simunic (1982, 443) note:
The theory of auditor credibility and differences in
credibility across firms implies that the means
through which auditors acquire and lose credibility is
an important area of study. At this time, we know
very little about these processes.
Results of this research will be of benefit to auditors.
Knowledge of the factors influencing a client's decision
to switch auditors following events that adversely affect
external auditor credibility will allow auditors to more
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accurately assess the consequences of such events.

With a

better understanding of the costs of a decline in
credibility, auditors will be better equipped to determine
the optimal level of resources allocated to maintaining
audit quality and minimizing the chances of a credibility
reducing event.
This research will also benefit auditors who have
experienced a decline in credibility.

By identifying

which clients are most sensitive to auditor credibility
the auditor will be able to maximize the effectiveness of
its efforts to retain existing clients and attract new
ones.

The audit firm will have the means to better target

its marketing strategy as it seeks to recover from the
effects of a loss of credibility.
Results of this research will also have public
policy implications.

The SEC will have information to

enable it to more fully assess the punitive impact of its
actions against auditors under Rule 2(e).

A more thorough

understanding of the consequences of a Rule 2(e) action
can allow the SEC to better determine when a Rule 2(e)
action is an appropriate regulatory response in dealing
with an audit firm's violation of existing rules.
Summary
This chapter has presented an overview of the
study.

The demand for and assessment of auditor

credibility was discussed, as well as the impact of SEC
Rule 2(e) actions on auditor credibility.

The research

objectives of the study were described, and the research
method to be employed was presented.

The expected

contribution of the study was also discussed.

The next

chapter will present a review of the relevant literature.
A detailed description of the research method used will be
presented in the third chapter. The fourth chapter will
discuss the results of the study, and the fifth chapter
will provide a discussion of the implications and
limitations of the study, as well as suggestions for
future research.

CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The accounting research in the area of auditor
credibility can be divided into two general types.

One

stream of research has attempted to measure capital market
perceptions of auditor credibility.

The other has

attempted to assess the demand for audit quality by
analyzing the auditor choices of client firms.

These two

approaches to the examination of auditor credibility, as
well as other research in the area, are reviewed in
subsequent sections of this chapter.
Market Based Research
Nichols and Smith (1985) investigated the market
reaction to clients switching between Big Eight auditors
and smaller auditors.

If there is a positive correlation

between auditor size and audit quality, as postulated by
DeAngelo (1981), then firms switching from a Big Eight
auditor to a smaller auditor should experience a negative
market reaction.

A positive market reaction would be

expected for a client switching to a Big Eight auditor
from a smaller auditor.

Although Nichols and Smith (1985)

did observe market reactions in the directions predicted,
12
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the magnitudes involved were not statistically
significant.
Ettredge, Shane, and Smith (1988, 32) related the
quality of an audit to the extent that accounting income
is correlated with future dividends:
Higher quality audits should be associated with
earnings reports that are more reflective of the
underlying events useful for predicting future
dividend flows.
From this perspective, the higher the quality of the
audit, the more likely it is that unexpected earnings
accurately reflect changes in future dividend flows.
Faced with a change in expected future dividends, the
market will adjust security returns accordingly.

If a

firm's financial statements are audited by a lower quality
auditor, investors may perceive that some portion of
unexpected earnings are due to errors and manipulation by
management, rather than events signaling a change in
future dividends.

The market would thus be less likely to

respond to unexpected earnings.

If Big Eight auditors

provide higher quality audits than smaller auditors, then
the correlation of unexpected earnings and abnormal
security returns should be higher for clients of Big Eight
auditors than for clients of smaller auditors.

After

controlling for client size and the sign of unexpected
earnings, the results were consistent with the hypothesis
that Big Eight auditors do provide higher quality audits.

Beatty (1989) examined the relationship between
auditor reputation and market returns for initial public
offerings in the capital market.

He found evidence

consistent with the hypothesis that clients employing a
more reputable auditor will receive a higher price for its
stock.

Investors appear willing to pay a higher price,

and thus accept a lower return, for the stock of a firm
associated with a more credible auditor.
Eichenseher, Hagigi, and Shields (1989) investigated
market reaction to changes in auditors by firms whose
securities are traded over-the-counter (OTC).

They found

a generally negative reaction to auditor changes, perhaps
indicating stockholder skepticism about management's
motives for the change.

The extent of the security price

response to an auditor switch was affected by the level of
management ownership in the firm.

The greater the share

of management ownership in the firm, the more negative the
market reaction to the switch in auditors.

The results

also indicated that the market responds more favorably to
changes to a Big Eight auditor than changes from a Big
Eight auditor.

This finding supports the hypothesis that

firms use the auditor selection decision as a signaling
mechanism to the market.

A change to a Big Eight auditor

can be interpreted as a positive signal about the firm's
future prospects.

Johnson and Lys (1990) were unable to document any
market reaction to a firm's announcement of a change from
a smaller auditor to a larger auditor.

An examination of

profitability for the three years prior to announcement of
the change in auditors revealed that firms switching to
larger auditors tended to outperform firms switching to
smaller auditors.

However, firms that did not switch

auditors were, on average, more profitable than firms that
did switch auditors, regardless of the direction of the
switch.
Client Choice Research
Carpenter and Strawser (1971) examined corporations
planning initial stock offerings.

They found that these

companies often replace their local or regional CPA firms
with a national auditor.

They (1971, 58) concluded:

. . . substantial emphasis appears to be placed on a
national firm's reputation as a known stamp of
financial statement reliability. . . .
Palmrose (1984) investigated the association between
agency cost variables and auditor selection.

She

hypothesized that the higher a firm's agency costs, the
more likely the firm would engage a higher-quality
auditor.

An auditor was considered a high quality auditor

if it was one of the Big Eight or was a specialist in the
same industry as the client firm.

Results were

16

inconclusive, with only firm size significantly related to
the choice of a higher-quality auditor.
Healy and Lys (1986) examined clients of smaller
auditors that had merged with Big Eight auditors.

They

postulated that a client would remain with the acquiring
Big Eight auditor if it benefitted from the larger
auditor's specialized services and/or reputation.

The

clients who would not benefit from these advantages were
more likely to switch to a non-Big Eight auditor after the
merger.

Healy and Lys (1986) predicted that a client's

demand for the increased reputation of a Big Eight auditor
was related to the client's size, rate of growth, and
plans to issue debt or equity in the near future.

Their

results indicated that clients remaining with the
acquiring Big Eight auditor tended to be larger and have
higher growth rates than those clients returning to a
smaller auditor.

No strong evidence was found to indicate

that clients planning to issue debt or equity in the near
future were more likely to remain with the Big Eight
auditor.
DeFond (1987) hypothesized that changes in
management ownership, firm leverage, and short-term
accruals are related to the firm's demand for audit
quality.

Decreases in the level of management ownership

of the firm and increases in firm leverage were expected
to lead to an increased demand for a quality audit.
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DeFond (1987) notes that a firm's management has a large
amount of discretion in determining the firm's short-term
accruals.

The larger the level of accruals, the greater

the potential for management manipulation of accruals.
Thus, DeFond (1987) posits a link between increases in
accruals and the demand for a higher-quality audit to
monitor management activities.
DeFond (1987) identified four surrogates for audit
quality.

These surrogates were auditor size, brand-name

reputation (Big Eight versus non-Big Eight), industry
expertise, and independence.

The independence of an

auditor with respect to any single client was measured as
the level of the client's revenues relative to the
revenues of all clients audited by the auditor.

A linear

combination of the four surrogates was developed to
generate a comprehensive proxy for audit quality.

Results

indicated that changes in management ownership and
leverage were significantly associated with the selection
of a high-quality auditor.

Changes in short-term accruals

were not significant.
Francis and Wilson (1988) tested the association
between a firm's agency costs and its demand for a quality
audit.

They (1988, 667) theorize the following:

. . . a higher quality audit can be considered as part
of the complex control system that mitigates the
relative inability of diffused ownership to directly
monitor and control management action.
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Audit quality was defined first as a dichotomous variable
(Big Eight auditors vs. all other auditors), and as a
continuous variable based on total client sales audited by
the auditor.

Francis and Wilson (1988) found an

association between agency cost proxies and auditor choice
when the first measure of audit quality was used.

No

consistent results were found for the continuous measure
of audit quality.
Williams (1988) investigated firms that switched
from one Big Eight auditor to another.

He found that in

selecting an auditor, clients appear to value industry
expertise and longevity.

Firms were less likely to switch

auditors if their current auditor was a specialist in
their industry.

Firms that had an established, long-term

relationship with their auditors were also less likely to
switch auditors.

Williams (1988) also found that firms

receiving negative media publicity were more likely to
switch auditors than other firms.

Williams (1988, 259)

notes:
The client's reputation also tends to influence
auditor changes.
Clients that received a tarnished
reputation appear to seek new auditors in an attempt
to renew the managers' faith in the monitoring of
financial statements.
Williams (1988) concluded that the results do not support
the common assertion that opinion shopping is a primary
motivation for auditor switching.

Another test of the association between auditor
choice and agency cost variables was provided by
Eichenseher and Shields (1989).

Consistent with Francis

and Wilson (1988), they postulate a positive relationship
between a firm's agency costs and its demand for a higherquality audit.

However, in some cases, the transactions

costs of switching auditors outweigh the agency cost
savings achieved by aligning with a higher-quality
auditor.

The relative size of the transactions costs and

agency cost savings will determine if the firm switches to
a higher-quality auditor.

From this perspective, the

switch to a higher-quality auditor can result in changes
in either incremental agency costs or incremental
transactions costs.

If the firm has reached the decision

to terminate its current auditor for reasons unrelated to
agency costs, such as a decline in the auditor-client
working relationship, then the marginal transactions cost
of switching to a higher-quality auditor is zero.
Increases in a firm's external financing, or changes in
management's share of firm ownership can alter the savings
in agency costs realized by switching auditors.
Whether the auditor switch was brought about by
declines in incremental transactions costs or by increases
in agency cost savings, a firm switching auditors will
select a new auditor that offers a level of audit quality
that best fits the firm's needs.

Therefore, the

relationship between agency costs and auditor selection
should be stronger for firms that have recently switched
auditors than for firms that have remained with their
current auditor for several years.

Eichenseher and

Shields (1989) found that agency cost variables explained
auditor selection for firms that had recently changed
auditors, while no significant association was found for
firms that had not switched auditors.

For firms that did

switch auditors, the association between agency cost
variables and auditor selection was greater two years
after the switch than at the time of the switch.

This

result indicates that firm may switch auditors in
anticipation of changes in agency costs.

Overall, the

results of Eichenseher and Shields (1989) support the
argument that the decision to switch auditors is affected
by both transactions costs and agency costs.
Wilson and Grimlund (1990) examined client reaction
to SEC actions under Rule 2(e).

Their results indicated

that an auditor affected by an SEC action tended to lose
market share to its competitors.

Also, auditors involved

in SEC actions had more difficulty retaining clients and
attracting new clients than other auditors.

The results

were consistent with the view that SEC actions under Rule
2(e) are events that adversely affect the credibility of
audit firms.
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Other Research
Schroeder, Solomon, and Vickrey (1986) surveyed
audit committee chairs of Fortune 500 companies in an
attempt to determine the factors they perceived as
affecting audit quality.

The results indicated that the

committee chairs rated audit-team specific factors as more
important in determining audit quality than firm-wide
factors.

For example, items such as the level of

partner/manager attention given to the audit and
communications between the audit team and management
ranked higher than litigation involving the CPA firm and
the recency and outcome of the auditor's peer review.
Palmrose (1988) attempted to use litigation as a
means for making audit quality distinctions among
auditors.

She posited an inverse relationship between

audit quality and litigation rates.

Within her framework,

litigation arises when an audit failure occurs in
conjunction with losses to either the client or the users
of the client's financial statements.

Since audit

failures are less likely when high quality audits are
performed, higher quality auditors should be the target of
less litigation than their lower quality counterparts.
Palmrose's results indicate that non-Big Eight auditors as
a group had higher litigation
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occurrence rates than the Big Eight.

This outcome is

consistent with Big Eight auditors providing higher
quality audits than their smaller competitors.
Knapp (1988) surveyed commercial loan officers to
determine the effects of auditor switches on the
credibility of a switching firm's financial statements.
The results indicated that a financially healthy firm that
switched from a non-Big Eight auditor to a Big Eight
auditor did not significantly increase the credibility of
its financial statements.

However, financially troubled

firms did increase the credibility of their financial
statements by switching from a non-Big Eight auditor to a
Big Eight auditor.
Summary
With the exception of Carpenter and Strawser (1971),
most accounting research in the area of auditor
credibility is of relatively recent origin.

The

literature has tended to treat auditor credibility as an
intertemporal constant, with only Healy and Lys (1986) and
Wilson and Grimlund (1990) investigating the reaction of
client firms to changes in auditor credibility.

Healy and

Lys (1986) examined an event wherein the reputation of a
client's auditor was increased through merger with a Big
Eight auditor.

Wilson and Grimlund (1990) examined an
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event where the reputation of a client's auditor was
adversely affected.
Another characteristic of the research to date is
the absence of an accepted measure of auditor credibility.
Most studies have treated auditor credibility as a
categorical variable— Big Eight auditors vs. all other
auditors.

Attempts to create a finer measure have met

with mixed results.

Beatty (1989) examined the cash

compensation paid to auditors by firms involved in initial
public offerings of stock.

He found a positive

correlation between auditor compensation and the price
paid for the stock by the market.

The results are

consistent with investors paying a higher price (and thus
accepting a lower return) for the stock of firms
associated with a higher quality auditor.
Francis and Wilson (1988) tested the association
between a firm's agency costs and its demand for a
credible audit.

When a simple Big Eight vs. non-Big Eight

auditor choice variable was used, the results indicated
that a firm's agency costs were positively related to its
demand for an audit by a Big Eight firm.

When a

continuous auditor choice variable (based on client sales
audited) was employed, no consistent association between
agency costs and auditor choice was found.
DeFond (1987) combined auditor size, industry
expertise, and independence into a single measure of

auditor credibility.

Using this measure, an association

between a client firm's agency costs and its choice of
auditor was documented.

Johnson and Lys (1990) used

the

relative size of a firm's new auditor to its previous
auditor as a measure of audit quality.

They found a

positive correlation between firm growth and movement to a
larger auditor.
The measures of auditor credibility used in the
literature have, for the most part, not incorporated
differences in credibility among Big Eight auditors, or
among smaller audit firms.

The use of a categorical

measure of credibility implicitly assumes that all Big
Eight auditors offer an equal level of credibility.
Similarly, all smaller audit firms are assumed to offer a
single level of credibility.

Although the research to

date has provided insight into some factors affecting a
firm's decision to employ a Big Eight vs. non-Big Eight
auditor, less is known about the factors affecting a
firm's decision to switch from one Big Eight auditor to
another, or from one smaller auditor to another.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHOD
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the
research method used in the study.

The first section

presents the objectives and research questions.
Subsequent sections review agency theory and prior
research used to generate research hypotheses.
Measurement of variables and sample selection are then
discussed.

The final part of the chapter details the

statistical techniques employed to analyze the data.
Research Objectives
This research has two main objectives.

The first is

to identify the factors affecting client firm reaction to
a decline in external auditor credibility.

Second, this

research will attempt to provide some initial insight into
whether the determinants of client reaction to a decline
in auditor credibility differ between clients of Big Eight
auditors and clients of smaller auditors.
Wilson and Grimlund (1990) found that SEC actions
under Rule 2(e) appeared to reduce auditor credibility.
The use of such actions as events damaging auditor
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credibility allows these objectives to be articulated in
the form of the following research questions:
1.

On what dimensions do firms that switch auditors
after an SEC Rule 2(e) action against their
external auditor differ from firms that do not
switch auditors after such an action?

2.

Are the differences between firms that switch
auditors and firms that do not switch auditors
after an SEC Rule 2(e) action against their
external auditor similar for clients of Big
Eight auditors and clients of smaller auditors?

Switching auditors is a costly activity for client
firms.

A firm retaining a new auditor will incur start-up

costs in the form of audit fees and demands on management
time as the auditor evaluates the firm's accounting system
(Healy and Lys 1986).

In making the decision to switch

auditors after an SEC Rule 2(e) action, a firm must weigh
the costs of switching against its demand for credible
auditing.

The following sections draw upon agency theory

and prior research to identify some factors affecting firm
demand for auditor credibility.
Agency Theory
Agency theory posits a divergence between the selfinterest of the manager of a firm and the interests of the
owners and creditors of the firm.

Jensen and Meckling

(1976) argue that the degree of divergence is tied to the
extent of management ownership in the firm.

A manager

with an ownership stake in the firm will have less
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incentive to shirk and more incentive to take actions
maximizing firm cash flows.

Extending this line of

reasoning, Francis and Wilson (1988, 666) argue:
It follows from this argument that firms with higher
levels of manager ownership would have less need for
higher-quality audits than would firms with lower
levels of manager ownership assuming a "convergence of
interests" as manager ownership increases.
If firms with a high degree of manager ownership have less
need for a credible audit, then one would expect the
degree of manager ownership to be a factor affecting a
firm's decision to switch auditors following a decline in
external auditor credibility.

This leads to the first

hypothesis (stated in the alternative form):
HI: Ceteris paribus, the smaller the manager's
ownership in the firm, the higher the probability
that the firm will switch auditors
following an SEC Rule 2(e) action against the
firm's external auditor.
Research investigating the relationship between manager
ownership and auditor choice has yielded mixed results.
Francis and Wilson (1988) tested the degree of management
ownership as a factor affecting the probability that a
firm switching auditors would select a Big Eight auditor.
No significant result was found. Eichenseher and Shields
(1989) found that management ownership was positively
associated with the switch to a Big Eight auditor.
Palmrose (1984) notes that one method owners use to
limit the divergence of interests between managers and
owners is a management compensation plan tied to reported
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financial performance.

Since compensation plans of this

nature rely on accounting-based financial information, a
firm using such a plan will incur additional monitoring
costs.

The increased need for monitoring can lead to a

demand for a higher credibility audit by the firm (Francis
and Wilson 1988).

Thus, the second hypothesis

(alternative form) to be tested is:
H2: Ceteris paribus, a firm with an accounting-based
management compensation plan is more likely to
switch auditors following an SEC Rule 2(e) action
against the firm's external auditor than a firm
without an accounting-based management
compensation plan.
Palmrose (1984) found no significant association
between the existence of an accounting-based management
compensation plan and the probability that a firm would
select a Big Eight auditor.

Francis and Wilson (1988)

also reported a lack of significance.

However, Francis

and Wilson (1988) did find that the implementation or
termination of a management bonus plan over a three-year
period was significantly associated with firm choice of a
Big Eight vs. smaller auditor.
Another aspect of agency theory is the conflict of
interest between the owner/managers of a firm and the
firm's debtholders.

Watts and Zimmerman (1986) discuss

the incentives of the owner/manager to transfer wealth
from the debtholders.

Palmrose (1984, 233) argues:

. . . the greater the proportion of debt in a
company's capital structure, the greater the potential
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for wealth transfers (that is, agency costs) from
bondholders to shareholders.
The greater the potential for wealth transfers, the more
likely creditors will be to include accounting-based
covenants in loan agreements.

These covenants are

designed to limit the ability of managers to effect these
transfers.

Credible audits provide debtholders with a

means of monitoring the debt covenants.

The demand for

credible auditing should therefore be positively
associated with the amount of debt in a firm's capital
structure (Palmrose 1984; Eichenseher and Shields 1989).
Francis and Wilson (1988) posit a negative
association between debt and the demand for credibility.
They (1988, 667) state:
If a firm switches to a lower-quality auditor, the
value of existing debt claims is expected to drop,
thus, increasing the value of stockholders' residual
claims.
Based on this reasoning, it is hypothesized
that firms with higher debt levels are more likely to
switch to a lower-quality auditor.
Francis and Wilson (1988) found the expected negative
association between firm leverage and choice of Big Eight
auditor.

Eichenseher and Shields (1989) found a positive

relationship between a firm's debt level and its tendency
to choose a Big Eight auditor.

Palmrose (1984) found a

negative, although statistically insignificant,
relationship between firm leverage and selection of a Big
Eight auditor.

Given the disagreement in the literature

about the relationship between existing debt and the
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demand for credibility, no directional hypothesis can be
formulated about the effect of leverage on a firm's
decision to switch auditors following an SEC Rule 2(e)
action against the firm's external auditor.

Therefore,

the third hypothesis, stated in the alternative, is:
H3: Ceteris paribus, a firm switching auditors
following an SEC Rule 2(e) action against the
firm's external auditor will have a significantly
different degree of leverage, on average, than
will a firm not switching auditors after an SEC
action.
The relationship between a firm's future financing
plans and its demand for credibility seems clearer than is
the case with existing debt.

As discussed earlier,

Carpenter and Strawser (1971) found that firms issuing
stock for the first time tended to switch to a national
auditor.

Healy and Lys (1986, 254) note:

Big Eight reputations are likely to be particularly
valuable to clients that anticipate raising debt or
equity in national or international financial markets,
since the Big Eight reputation lowers the information
costs of potential investors.
Conversely, Big Eight
brand names will be less valuable for clients that
finance investments internally and do not anticipate
raising outside capital.
Thus, a positive association between a firm's future
financing plans and its demand for auditor credibility is
expected.

This leads to the hypothesis (alternative

form):
H4: Ceteris paribus, a firm issuing debt or equity
will be more likely to switch auditors following
an SEC Rule 2(e) action against the firm's
external auditor than will a firm with no plans to
raise funds.
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Empirical results to date have been mixed.

Healy and Lys

(1986) found that the issuance of debt or equity did not
appear to affect a firm's choice of auditor.

Francis and

Wilson (1988) found a positive relationship between a
firm's issuance of equity or debt and its decision to
retain a Big Eight auditor.
Two other characteristics that may affect firm
response to changes in auditor credibility are the size of
the firm and the growth of the firm.

Palmrose (1984)

notes that as the size of the firm increases, so do its
agency costs.

A larger, more rapidly growing firm is

likely to enter into more agency relationships, and the
scale of firm operations makes observation of management
by owners more difficult.

Larger, growing firms must rely

more upon audits as a means of monitoring.

A positive

association is therefore expected between firm size and
growth, and firm demand for credibility.

From the

perspective of agency theory, larger and more rapidly
growing firms should be more likely to react by changing
auditors when an event adversely affects the credibility
of their external auditor.
A different view of the relationship between firm
size and the demand for credibility can be gained when the
amount of information available about different sizes of
firms is considered.

Wilson and Grimlund (1990) note that

for large firms, financial statements comprise only a
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small part of the information set upon which estimates of
future cash flows are based.

These alternative sources of

information allow the market to anticipate most of the
information contained in the firm's financial statements.
Wilson and Grimlund (1990, 48) conclude:
Events affecting the credibility of the financial
statements themselves (such as an SEC action against
an audit firm) may have comparatively little effect on
estimates of expected cash flows.
The financial statements of smaller firms make up a large
part of the information set upon which estimates of future
cash flows are based (Grant 1980; Atiase 1985).

Events

affecting the credibility of a smaller firm's financial
statements may have a larger impact on its stock price
than similar events for a larger firm.

Wilson and

Grimlund (1990, 48) suggest:
Management of a smaller firm may have greater
incentive to retain a credible auditor, or to switch
to a more credible public accounting firm if their
current auditor suffers a perceived loss of
reputation.
Based on the above discussion, no directional hypothesis
can be formulated about the influence of firm size and
growth on a firm's decision to switch auditors following
an SEC Rule 2(e) action against the firm's external
auditor. The hypotheses (stated in the alternative) to be
tested are:
H5: Ceteris paribus, a firm switching auditors
following an SEC Rule 2(e) action against the
firm's external auditor will, on average, differ

33

significantly in size from a firm that does not
switch auditors after an SEC action.
H6: Ceteris paribus, a firm switching auditors
following an SEC Rule 2(e) action against the
firm's external auditor will, on average, have a
rate of growth significantly different from a firm
that does not switch auditors after an SEC action.
Several studies have attempted to test whether firm
size and firm growth are related to auditor choice.
Palmrose (1984) found a positive relationship between firm
size and selection of a Big Eight auditor.

Healy and Lys

(1986) found that large, rapidly growing firms were more
likely to retain a Big Eight auditor.

Eichenseher and

Shields (1989) found mixed support for a positive
association between size and choice of a Big Eight
auditor.

Wilson and Grimlund (1990) found that auditors

involved in an SEC action were more likely to lose market
share among the small client market segment than for the
market as a whole.
Variables Drawn From Prior Research
Some findings from previous research suggest
additional factors affecting firm response to changes in
external auditor credibility.

Lynn (1985) surveyed firms

with and without audit committees about the relative
importance of auditor selection criteria.

She found that

the national prestige of an auditor was more important to
firms with audit committees than to firms without audit
committees.

Since auditor prestige is more important to
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firms with audit committees, these firms are expected to
be more likely to respond to a loss of auditor prestige by
changing auditors.

This leads to the hypothesis

(alternative form):
H7: Ceteris paribus, a firm with a corporate audit
committee is more likely to switch auditors
following an SEC Rule 2(e) action against the
firm's external auditor than a firm without a
corporate audit committee.
Schwartz and Menon (1985) postulate that a firm
purchasing an audit is acquiring a package of attributes,
including the reputation of the auditor, its industry
expertise, and its responsiveness to client needs.

The

firm's weighting of the importance of each of these
attributes governs its selection of an auditor.

However,

the firm's attribute weighting may not remain stable over
time.

As Schwartz and Menon (1985, 252) note:

A company will optimize the package of services it
receives by making trade-offs among the various
dimensions of the audit product subject to the
constraint of audit cost. A deterioration in
financial condition can result in the purchasers of
the audit services changing the importance attached to
different dimensions of the audit product as well as
to the cost of the audit itself.
Schwartz and Menon (1985) found that firms nearing
bankruptcy were more likely to switch to a different class
of auditor, from a Big Eight auditor to a smaller auditor,
or from a smaller auditor to a Big Eight auditor.

The

results indicate that financial distress may cause firms
to reorder their priorities, including the importance of
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auditor reputation,

in selecting an auditor.

Thus, firm

response to an event adversely affecting the credibility
of an external auditor is expected to be associated with
the financial health of the firm.

The limited research to

date on this issue provides no evidence about the
direction of this relationship.

Stated in the

alternative, the hypothesis to be tested is:
H8: Ceteris paribus, a firm switching auditors
following an SEC Rule 2 (e) action against the
firm's external auditor will, on average, have a
level of financial health different from a firm
that does not switch auditors following an SEC
action.
Another factor that may affect a firm's decision to
switch auditors following an SEC Rule 2(e) action against
its external auditor is the industry to which the firm
belongs.

Shockley and Holt (1S83) surveyed chief

financial officers of banks and found a close relationship
between the perceived banking industry expertise of an
auditor and the auditor's share of the banking market.
The findings of Shockley and Holt (1983) suggest that
there may be an industry specific component to auditor
credibility.

If so, firms may be reluctant to terminate

relationships with auditors perceived as specialists in
their industry.

The following hypothesis (alternative

form) can be formulated:
H9: Ceteris paribus, a firm will be less likely to
switch auditors following an SEC Rule 2(e) action
against the firm's external auditor if the auditor
is a specialist in that firm's industry.
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In addition to an industry specific component to
auditor credibility, prior research has suggested that a
geographic component to credibility exists.

Wilson and

Grimlund (1990) found that the negative consequences of an
SEC action were more severe in the state where the audit
failure that had triggered the action occurred than for
the nation as a whole.

An auditor was less able to retain

existing clients and attract new clients in the state
focused on by the SEC action.

This result leads to the

following hypothesis (alternative form):
H10: Ceteris paribus, a firm will be more likely to
switch auditors following an SEC Rule 2(e)
action against the firm's external auditor if
the SEC action deals with an audit failure in
the firm's state.
One research objective of this study is to provide
some insight into whether the factors affecting a firm's
decision to switch auditors following an event adversely
affecting the credibility of the firm's external auditor
differed between clients of Big Eight auditors and clients
of smaller auditors.

Since theory and prior research

provide no expectations about the direction or magnitude
of differences between clients of Big Eight auditors and
clients of smaller auditors, no directional hypothesis can
be formulated about these differences.
(alternative form) to be tested is:

The hypothesis
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Hll: Ceteris paribus, any differences between firms
that do and do not switch auditors following an
SEC Rule 2(e) action will not be the same for
clients of Big Eight auditors as for clients of
smaller auditors.
Measurement of Variables
The degree of management ownership (MOWN) was
measured by dividing the number of shares of common stock
owned by management by the total number of shares of stock
outstanding.

Information about the degree of management

ownership was available in a firm's annual proxy statement
or Form 10-K.

Also, revealed in a firm's proxy statement

is the existence of a management bonus plan (MBONUS).

A

dichotomous variable was used to represent the disclosure,
or lack of disclosure, of such a plan.
Firm leverage (DEBT) was measured as

the ratio of a

firm's total debt to its total assets. A similar measure
was employed by Eichenseher and Shields (198,9) . The
information necessary to calculate leverage was available
in a firm's audited financial statements.

As discussed

earlier, there is disagreement in the literature about the
association between firm leverage and the demand for
credibility.
Firm financial statements contained information
about new issues of debt or equity by a firm.

The

variable NISSUE was defined as the total dollar amount of
such issues in the three years following an SEC action
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against the firm's auditor scaled by the firm's total
assets at the time of the SEC action.

A similar approach

was taken by Healy and Lys (198 6).
Two measures were employed as proxies for firm sise
(SIZE) and rate of growth (GROWTH).

The first approach

was to use the total assets of a firm as a proxy for firm
size (SIZE), while the percentage change in assets over
the three year period before the SEC action was used as a
measure of firm growth (GROWTH).

Similar measures of size

and growth were used by Francis and Wilson (1988) and
Healy and Lys (1986).

The second proxies for these

variables employed a firm's annual sales as the measures
of SIZE and GROWTH.

Consistent with prior research, the

natural logarithms of assets and sales were used in the
analyses.

As discussed above, no clear expectations can

be drawn about the relationship of these variables to the
probability that a firm will switch auditors after an
event adversely affecting the credibility of its external
auditor.
Firm proxy statements and annual reports were
examined for the presence of a corporate audit committee
(AUDCOM).

A dichotomous zero/one variable measured the

absence/existence of an audit committee.
A measure of firm financial distress (FDIST) was
generated with a discriminant analysis model proposed by
Altman (1983).

First discussed in Altman (1968), the

model uses a linear combination of financial ratios to
assign a measure of financial health to each sample firm.
As is noted by Jones (1987, 143), "the multivariate
approach has appeal because it reduces many financial
dimensions to a single score."

Although bankruptcy

prediction techniques have evolved in recent years, the
Altman (1983) model possesses a combination of
classification accuracy and availability of input data
that makes it suitable for exploratory research such as
this study.
A dichotomous variable (SPEC) was used to indicate
if a firm's auditor is a specialist in the industry.
Consistent with Palmrose (1984), an auditor was considered
an industry specialist if its share of the industry ranked
either first or second among auditors serving the
industry.

Information about auditor market shares by

industry was obtained from the COMPUSTAT data base for the
years in question.
The state in which a firm is based is revealed in
its 10-K, as well as reference material such as Who Audits
America.

A dichotomous variable (STATE) was used to

indicate whether the audit failure that triggered the SEC
action against the firm's external auditor took place in
the firm's home state.

Information about the

operationalization of the variable STATE, and the other
variables discussed above, is provided in Table 1.
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TABLE 1
DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES
Hypothesis

Variable
Name

Expected
Sign*

Description

His

MOWN6

Percentage of common
stock owned by
management.

H2:

MBONUS

Dichotomous variable
indicating the
existence of an
accounting-based
compensation plan
(l=existence,
0=absence).

H3:

DEBT'

Ratio of a firm's
total debt to its
total assets.

H4:

NISSUE'

Dollar amount of new
issues of debt and
equity in the year
years following an
SEC action, divided
by assets at time of
the action.

H5:

SIZE'

Total assets (total
sales) of firm.

H6;

GROWTH'

% change in assets
(sales) in three
years prior to SEC
action.
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TABLE 1-Continued
Hypothesis
H9:

H10:

Variable
Name

Expected
Sign*

Dichotomous variable
indicating whether
firm's auditor is a
specialist in that
firm's industry
(l=specialist, 0=not
specialist).

SPECd

STATE0

Description

+

Dichotomous variable
indicating whether
sample firm is
located in the state
where the audit
failure that
triggered the SEC
action occurred.

* Expected sign is relationship between variable and
likelihood of firm switching auditors following
SEC action.
b Data available in firm proxy statements.
c Data available in firm financial statements.
d Data obtained from COMPUSTAT data base.
Sample Selection
Actions by the SEC against auditors under Rule 2(e)
of the SEC's Rules of Practice were used as events that
adversely affect the credibility of an auditor.

The SEC

publishes its Rule 2(e) actions in the form of Accounting
and Auditing Enforcement Releases (formerly Accounting
Series Releases).

The actions identified by Wilson and

Grimlund (1990) were employed, along with a review of
recent Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases
(AAERs), to identify any SEC actions subsequent to that
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research.

Consistent with Wilson and Grimlund (1990),

only actions against national auditors were

used. Table 2

provides a summary of SEC Rule 2(e) actions against audit
firms through 1986.4
TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF SEC RULE 2(e) ACTIONS AGAINST
NATIONAL AUDIT FIRMS
Year

SEC Reference

Firm Name

1976
1978

ASR
ASR

#196, #196A
#241

1978
1979
1981
1981
1983
1984
1985
1985

ASR
ASR
ASR
ASR
AAER
AAER
AAER
AAER

#248
#153A
#288
#292
#13, #16
#45
#57, #68
#78

Seidman & Seidman
Deloitte, Haskins
& Sells
Ernst & Whinney
Touche Ross
Kenneth Leventhal
Arthur Andersen
Touche Ross
Coopers & Lybrand
Grant Thornton
Seidman & Seidman

Legend : ASR-— Accounting Series Release
AAER— Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Release
For each event, Who Audits America (WAA) and the
COMPUSTAT data base were used to generate a sample of
clients that had switched auditors within two years after
an SEC action against their auditor.

Firms that switched

to an auditor that had also been the target of an SEC

4 Table 2 does not include SEC Rule 2(e) actions
against auditors where the cited auditor merged with
another auditor within two years of the SEC action. Also,
Table 2 is restricted to actions against audit firms,
rather than actions against individual members of an audit
f irm.

action within the previous two years were not included in
the sample.

Consistent with prior research (Healy and Lys

1986), financial service and real estate firms are
excluded from the sample because of their markedly
different financial characteristics.

Subsidiary firms and

firms controlled by other companies were also excluded.
To provide a basis for comparison, for each event a random
sample of clients that did not switch auditors within the
two year period was selected.

The use of a two year

period is consistent with the approach of Healy and Lys
(1986) in their examination of auditor changes following
CPA firm mergers.

The two groups of sample firms were

labeled the Switch and Non-Switch groups.
Statistical Tests
Both univariate and multivariate statistical
techniques were used to analyze the data.

The univariate

tests consisted of t-tests and the Chi-square test for
independence of classification.

The nonparametric Mann-

Whitney test was employed to provide additional evidence
about the results of the t-tests.
were conducted using a logit model.

The multivariate tests
The following

sections detail the statistical procedures performed in
this study.
described.

A further analysis of the data is then
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Univariate Tests
Univariate tests were first employed to analyze the
sample data. The t-test was used to test for significant
differences in the continuous independent variables
between the Switch and Non-Switch groups.

Two underlying

assumptions of the t-test are that the populations to be
compared have normal distributions and that they have
identical variances

(Hays 1981, 286).

As a practical

matter, however, the conclusions reached through use of a
t-test may not be affected by any violations of these
assumptions for samples of moderate to large size (Hays
1981, 287) .
To provide additional evidence about the t-test
results, the nonparametric Mann-Whitney test was also
conducted for the continuous independent variables.

The

Mann-Whitney test provides a nonparametric alternative to
the t-test for the equality of means between two
populations (Hays 1981, 587).

For large samples, the

Mann-Whitney test statistic is approximately normally
distributed (Hays 1981, 589).

The Mann-Whitney test was

used by Chow (1982) to examine differences between two
groups of sample firms for a series of financial
variables.
The variables MBONUS, AUDCOM, SPEC, and STATE are
dichotomous. The relationship between each dichotomous
variable and the Switch and Non-Switch groups was examined
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by means of a Chi-square test for independence of
classification.

Prior studies that have used the Chi-

square test to examine differences between groups of firms
for a dichotomous variable include Schwartz and Menon
(1985) and Chow (1982).
Multivariate Tests
In addition to the univariate tests described above,
multivariate tests were used to analyze the sample data.
Results from the multivariate tests serve as a check on
the univariate results (Chow 1982).
used.

A logit model was

The dependent variable in the model was coded "I"

if the firm switched auditors after an SEC action against
its external auditor.

If the firm remains with the

auditor, the dependent variable is coded "0".

Ordinary

Least Squares (OLS) regression is inappropriate when the
dependent variable is dichotomous.

As is discussed by

Aldrich and Nelson (1984), if the dependent variable is
dichotomous, OLS estimates will lead to incorrect
estimates of sampling variances and invalid hypothesis
tests.

Stone and Rasp (1991) note that for very small

sample sizes (less than 100 sample items), logit model
coefficients may be biased and OLS model coefficients may
be slightly more efficient.

The sample size in this study

is larger than the 100 unit level discussed by Stone and
Rasp.
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The variables described in Table 1 are the
independent variables in the logit model. The model takes
take the general form:
Y = f(MOWN, MBONUS, DEBT, NISSUE, SIZE, GROWTH,
AUDCOM, FDIST, SPEC, STATE),
where Y = 0 if the firm does not switch auditors
within two years of an SEC action against
its auditor, and
Y = 1 if the firm does switch auditors within
two years of an SEC action against
its auditor.
A statistically significant coefficient for an independent
variable is interpreted as evidence that the variable
affects the probability that a firm will switch auditors
following an SEC action against its external auditor.
The logit model has been widely used in prior
research.

Healy and Lys (1986) employed the model to

analyze auditor changes following Big Eight mergers with
non-Big Eight auditors.

Palmrose (1984) also employed a

logit model in her investigation of auditor changes by
client firms.

Williams (1988) used a logit model in an

attempt to discover some potential determinants of auditor
choice.

The use of a logit model in the present context

is consistent with the approach employed in previous
studies.

Further Analysis
To provide some insight into differences between
clients of Big Eight auditors and clients of smaller
auditors, the sample was broken into two subsets.

One

subset consists of client firms of Big Eight auditors.
The other is composed of client firms of non-Big Eight
auditors.

The univariate tests and logit model are then

be applied to each subset.

Results from each subset of

sample firms are then compared for evidence of any
differences between the two groups.
Summary
This chapter has presented the method used in the
study.

The research questions were presented and

hypotheses developed from agency theory and prior
research.

Sample selection and measurement of variables

were discussed, as were the statistical techniques
employed.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS
The purpose of this chapter is to present the
results of the statistical tests described in the
preceding chapter.

A description of the sample selection

is presented first, followed by a review of the univariate
test results.

The results of the multivariate tests are

then discussed.

The chapter concludes with a further

analysis of both univariate and multivariate results.
Sample Selection
Annual reports, proxy statements, and Form 10-K's on
file at the University of Texas, the University of
Chicago, Louisiana State University, and the University of
Southwestern Louisiana were examined for information about
the sample firms.

Other financial information was

obtained from Moodv's Industrial Manual. Moody's Over the
Counter Manual, and the COMPUSTAT data base. Information
on all variables was not available for all sample firms.
Table 3 shows the total sample size for each of the
independent variables, as well as the number of firms for
which all data was available.

Refer to Table 1 (page 40)

for definitions of the variables.
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Lower sample sizes for
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the variables MOWN, AUDCOM, and MBONUS were chiefly due to
missing firm proxy statements.
TABLE 3
SAMPLE SIZE SUMMARY
ariable

Sample
Size

MOWN

346

MBONUS

349

DEBT

483

NISSUE

423

SIZE - Assets

483

SIZE - Sales

479

GROWTH -Assets

420

GROWTH - Sales

415

AUDCOM

351

FDIST

472

SPEC

483

STATE

483

All Variables

259

The primary cause of missing sample data was the
unavailability of proxy statements for some firms.

Many

of the smaller firms in the sample filed proxy statements
with the SEC irregularly during the time period examined.
The variables most affected by missing proxy statements
were MOWN, AUDCOM, and MBONUS.

Data for all independent

variables were available for 259 sample firms.
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Univariate Results
Univariate tests were first employed to analyze the
data and test for significant differences between the
Switch and Non-Switch groups for the continuous
independent variables.
presented in Table 4.

Results of these tests are
Variable means and standard

deviations are given for both groups of client firms.

The

Switch group contains clients that changed auditors within
two years of an SEC action against their auditor.

The

Non-Switch group consists of client firms that did not
change auditors for the two years following an SEC action
against their auditor.

Both t-test results and Mann-

Whitney statistics for differences between the groups are
presented.

51

TABLE 4

UNIVARIATE TEST RESULTS - CONTINUOUS VARIABLES
Switch Non-Switch
Mann-Whitney
Variable________ Group____ Group____ t-value_____ z-value
MOWN— mean
(std. dev.)

0.329
(0.217)

0.259
(0.198)

3.11”**

32.32“*

DEBT

0.574
(0.433)

0.523
(0.281)

1.52

41.72*”

NISSUE

0.271
(1.595)

0.136
(0.599)

1.09*

52.61*“

SIZE— Assets

9.604
(1.764)

10.888
(2.077)

-7.34”*

49.77”*

GROWTH— Assets

0.276
(0.807)

0.189
(0.336)

1.37

54.03”*

SIZE— Sales

9.719
(2.130)

10.971
(2.377)

-6.07*”

49.49*”

GROWTH— Sales

0.336
(1.067)

0.182
(0.443)

1.83*

54.59*”

5.479
(17.727)

6.431
(18.411)

FDIST

-0.57

46.09*”

p-value < 0.10
p-value < 0.05
p-value < 0.01
*

one tail test

The t-test results show significant differences
between the two groups for two cf the eight variables
examined.

Contrary to expectations, clients that switched

auditors had a higher degree of managerial ownership than
clients in the Non-Switch group.
the 0.01 level.

MOWN was significant at

Although firms that switched auditors

were more highly leveraged than their non-switching
counterparts, the DEBT variable was not significant at the
0.05 level.

Neither a client's future financing plans, as

52

measured by NISSUE, nor its level of financial distress
(FDIST) differed significantly between the two groups.
Both measures of SIZE were significant at the 0.01
level.

Clients that switched auditors were significantly

smaller, both in assets and sales, than the clients in the
Non-Switch group.

The different measures of GROWTH

yielded differing results, however.

Clients that switched

auditors tended to have faster asset and sales growth
rates than clients that did not switch auditors.

When

GROWTH is measured in terms of total assets, the
difference between the two groups is not statistically
significant.

The use of annual sales as a measure of

GROWTH revealed a difference between the two groups that
is significant at the 0.10 level.
As discussed in the preceding chapter, an underlying
assumption of the t-test is that the populations being
compared have normal distributions.

Lack of prior

knowledge about the normality of the distributions of the
continuous variables led to the use of the nonparametric
Mann-Whitney test to provide additional evidence about the
validity of the t-test results.

Results of the Mann-

Whitney test for differences between the two groups are
presented in Table 4.
The nonparametric test provides a strikingly
different picture than the t-test results.

All variables

were different at the 0.01 level in the Mann-Whitney test
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results.

An examination of the distribution of the

continuous independent variables revealed a large degree
of skewness and kurtosis for all variables, indicating a
violation of the normality assumption.

The t-test results

may not be reliable as a result.
A factor potentially confounding the results
presented in Table 4 is the inclusion of clients in the
Switch group that would have changed auditors within the
two year period irrespective of an SEC action against
their auditor.

There may be clients whose evolving

demands for auditor credibility would lead them to switch
from a smaller auditor to a Big Eight auditor, or vice
versa.

Inclusion of clients that have switched auditors

because of a change in their demand for credibility in the
same group as clients who have changed auditors as a
result of a decline in their auditor's credibility could
affect the results.
To partially control for this possibility, clients
switching from a Big Eight auditor to a smaller auditor,
or vice versa, were excluded from the Switch group.

The

clients remaining in the Switch group changed from one Big
Eight auditor to another, or from one non-Big Eight
auditor to another, strengthening the inference that
differences between the Switch and Non-Switch groups are
due to changes in auditor credibility, and not to changes
in client demand for credibility.

Differences between the

revised Switch group and the Non-Switch group were then
tested for significance.

The results are presented in

Table 5.
Table 5
UNIVARIATE TEST RESULTS - CONTINUOUS VARIABLES
Reduced Sample
Switch
Grouo

Variable

Non-Switch
Mann-Whitney
Grouo
t-value
z-value

MOWN— mean
(std. dev.)

0.315
(0.208)

0.259
(0.198)

2.22” *

45.73”*

DEBT

0.576
(0.305)

0.523
(0.281)

1.74“

56.75*“

NISSUE

0.177
(0.605)

0.136
(0.599)

0.59*

35.37“”

SIZE— Assets

9.915
(1.731)

10.888
(2.077)

-4.98”*

63.33*”

GROWTH— Assets

0.315
(0.954)

0.189
(0.336)

1.41

36.68”*

SIZE— Sales

10.114
(2.018)

10.971
(2.377)

-3.77”*

63.53“*

GROWTH— Sales

0.336
(1.177)

0.182
(0.443)

1.65*

36.66”*

FDIST

3.580
(3.897)

6.431
(18.411)

-2.37”

62.90”*

p-value < 0.10
p-value < 0.05
p-value < 0.01
one tail test

The results in Table 5 generally confirm the results
for the full sample presented in Table 4.

T-test

results were similar for all variables except MOWN, DEBT,
and PDIST.

The full sample results in Table 4 indicate
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that the differences between the Switch group and the NonSwitch group for MOWN are significant at the 0.01 level.
The revised Switch group results are not as strong, with
the differences for MOWN significant at the 0.05 level.
DEBT, insignificant in the full sample, was significant at
the 0.10 level in Table 5.
The full sample t-test results in Table 4 showed no
significant difference between the two groups' level of
financial distress, as measured by FDIST.

When the

revised Switch group is compared to the Non-Switch group,
the t-test results are significant at the 0.05 level.

As

in Table 4, the nonparametric Mann-Whitney test results
are significant at the 0.01 level for all variables,
indicating that the t-test results are affected by the
lack of normality.
Dichotomous independent variables were tested using
the Chi-square test for independence of classification.
The results of this test are presented in Table 6.

As

indicated in Table 6, MBONUS and STATE had no significant
influence on the tendency of a sample firm to switch
auditors following an SEC action.

As expected, clients of

auditors who were specialists in their industry (SPEC)
were significantly less likely to switch auditors.
Surprisingly, firms with a corporate audit committee
(AUDCOM) were less likely to switch auditors than firms
without an audit committee.

As with the continuous

variables, the tests were conducted again using a revised
Switch group that excluded client firms which had changed
their level of auditor following an SEC action.

No

difference in the results was found.
TABLE 6
CHI-SQUARE TEST OF DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLES
STATE

In-State

Out of State

Totals

Switch

37

185

222

Non-Switch

35

226

261

Totals

72

411

483

Chi-Square (1 d.f.) = 1.003
p-value = 0.316
SPEC

Specialist

Non-Soecialist

Totals

Switch

42

180

222

Non-Switch

80

181

261

122

361

483

Totals

Chi-Square (1 d.f.) = 8.746
p-value = 0.003
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TABLE 6-Continued

AUDCOM

Committee

No Committee

Switch

86

73

159

Non-Switch

145

47

192

Totals

231

120

351

Totals

Chi-Square (1 d.f.) = 17.757
p-value < 0 .001
No Bonus Plan

MBONUS

Bonus Plan

Switch

71

88

159

Non-Switch

95

95

190

166

183

349

Totals

Chi-Square (1 d.f.) =

Totals

0.991

p-value = 0 .319
To provide additional insight into these results,
simple Pearson correlations among the independent
variables were calculated.
in Table 7.

The correlations are presented

The results reveal several significant

correlations among the independent variables.

For example

SIZE was highly correlated with SPEC, AUDCOM, MBONUS,
MOWN, NISSUE, and FDIST.

A large number of significant

correlations were also observed when client sales was used
as the measure of SIZE and GROWTH.

Similar results were

obtained when clients changing their level of external
auditor were deleted from the Switch group.
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S IM P L E
STATE
STATE

TABLE 7
P E A R S O N C O R R E L A T IO N C O E F F I C I E N T S
SPEC

-0 .0 5 6

1.000

AUDCOM

-0 .0 3 2

0 .0 6 5

MBONUS

-0 .0 2 7

-0 .0 4 3

S IZ E 1

-0 .0 5 3

GROWTH1 - 0 . 0 1 0

N IS S U E
D EB T
F D IS T

0.247***

1.000
0.126**

1.000

0 .4 9 8 "*

0 .2 3 9 * "
-0 .0 4 2

-0 .0 6 0

0 .0 8 5

-0 .0 6 3

-0 .3 4 6 * "

-0 .1 2 5 "

-0 .4 3 9 "*

-0 .0 3 7

-0 .0 2 3

-0 .0 9 5 *

-0 .0 2 4

-0 .1 5 4 * "

0 .0 0 1

-0 .0 5 0

-0 .0 7 7

-0 .0 3 7

0 .0 0 9

MOWN

-0 .1 4 0 * "

N IS S U E

DEBT

F D IS T

0 .105*

1.000

N IS S U E

0 .0 2 7

0 .0 6 8

1.000

-0 .0 5 8

0 .0 1 9

0 .5 6 2

0 .0 5 5

0 .2 2 1 ""

p - v a lu e < 0 .1 0
p - v a lu e < 0 .0 5

*"

p - v a lu e < 0 .0 1

*

a s m easured in a s s e ts

-0 .0 4 3

-0 .0 8 5

MOWN

0 .1 5 9 * "

0 .0 6 1

-0 .0 9 9 *

1.000

"

1.000

-0 .0 2 6

GROWTH

F D IS T

S IZ E a

-0 .0 8 2 *

GROWTH

D EB T

MBONUS

1.000

SPEC

MOWN

AUDCOM

1.000
-0 .1 1 0 "*

1.000

The large number of highly correlated independent
variables calls into question the overall significance of
the univariate test results.

Observed differences in

independent variables may be due to differences in
reaction to an SEC action, or simply due to correlation
with another variable for which such differences exist.
The significance at or below the 0.10 level of 16 of the
45 correlations in Table 7 indicates the need for further
analysis of the data using a multivariate approach.

This

approach is presented in the following section.
Multivariate Results
A logit model was formulated to further investigate
the univariate results. The model employed total assets as
a measure of firm size (SIZE) and rate of growth (GROWTH).
Results of the logit model are presented in Table 8.

The

model results were unchanged by use of annual sales as a
measure of SIZE and GROWTH.
results are not shown.

As a consequence, those
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TABLE 8
LOGIT MODEL RESULTS
Parameter
Hypothesis Variable Coefficient Chi-Square P--value
HI
H2
H3
H4
H5
H6
H7
H8
H9
H10
Intercept

MOWN
MBONUS
DEBT
NISSUE
SIZE4
GROWTH4
AUDCOM
FDIST
SPEC
STATE

-0.533
0.071
-0.217
0.233
-0.409
0.290
-0.393
-0.005
-0.362
0.573
4.597

Model Chi- Square
a as measured in assets

0.43
0.06
0.12
0.33
17.86
0.93
1.33
0.76
1.16
2.12
15.49

0.51
0.80
0.73
0.56
< 0.01
0.33
0.24
0.38
0.28
0.14
< 0.01

42.36

< 0.01

As seen in Table 8, the coefficients for most of the
independent variables are not significant.

Firm size is

the only variable with a significant coefficient
< 0.01).

(p-value

Removal of clients changing the level of their

auditor from the Switch group did not affect the results.
Despite the lack of significance of most of the
coefficients, the model as a whole was statistically
significant (p-value < 0.01).

In view of the overall

significance of the logit model, the lack of significance
of the individual coefficients suggests that the
correlations among the independent variables are strong
enough to distort the results.

If the independent

variables are highly correlated, Berenson, Levine, and
Goldstein (1983, 414) note:
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. . . it is difficult if not impossible to assess the
unique effects individual explanatory variables have
upon the response variable.
Given the unreliability of the logit model's
coefficients due to the presence of multicollinearity, a
stepwise logit procedure was employed to provide a clearer
picture of the contribution of individual independent
variables to the model.

Under this procedure, also

adopted by Williams (1988), individual variables were
added to the model and retained only if they were
significant at the 0.05 level.

The results of the

stepwise logit procedure were identical to the full model
results.

The only significant independent variable was

SIZE, as measured in either sales or assets.
The results of the multivariate logit analysis
suggest that most observed differences in the univariate
test results were attributable to high levels of
correlation among the independent variables.

The only

variable for which a significant result was consistently
found was SIZE.

The results indicate that smaller firms

are more likely to switch auditors following an SEC action
against their external auditor than are larger firms.
Further Analysis
One of the objectives of the study is to examine
differences between clients of Big Eight auditors and
clients of smaller audit firms.

To that end, the

univariate and multivariate procedures described above are
applied to each type of client.

The clients of Big Eight

auditors are discussed first.
As before, both t-tests and the Mann-Whitney test
were used to examine the continuous independent variables
for differences between the Switch and Non-Switch groups.
The results of this univariate analysis are presented in
Table 9.
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TABLE 9

UNIVARIATE TEST RESULTS - CONTINUOUS VARIABLES
Clients of Big Eight Auditors
Switch
Grouo

Non-Switch
Grouo

MOWN— mean
(std. dev.)

0.321
(0.218)

0.227
(0.180)

3.69****

DEBT

0.588
(0.461)

0.506
(0.202)

2.16**

61.72***

NISSUE

0.309
(1.770)

0.137
(0.634)

1.13*

36.59***

SIZE— Assets

9.812
(1.680)

11.326
(1.974)

-7.98***

70.68***

GROWTH— Assets

0.267
(0.864)

0.182
(0.293)

1.15

38.99***

SIZE— Sales

10.014
(2.029)

11.485
(2.139)

-6.76***

70.60***

GROWTH— Sales

0.338
(1.071)

0.149
(0.240)

2.12**

37.30***

5.649
(19.625)

6.360
(18.980)

Variable

FDIST

t-value

-0.34

Mann-Whitney
z-value
3.50***

67.46***-

p-value < 0.10
p-value < 0.05
p-value < 0.01
*

one tail test

As was the case with the full sample of clients
(Table 4), the Mann-Whitney test results indicate
significant differences between the two groups for all
variables.

The t-test results for Big Eight clients are

also similar to those of the full sample, with the
exception of DEBT.

Not significant for the sample as a

whole, the t-statistic for DEBT is significant at the 0.05
level for Big Eight clients.

The sample of Big Eight clients discussed in Table
9, includes clients that switched from a Big Eight auditor
to a smaller audit firm.

Consistent with the earlier

analysis, these clients were deleted from the sample to
partially control for auditor switches due to a change in
a client's demand for credible auditing.

The results

(not presented) confirm those reported in Table 9, with
the exception of FDIST.

As reported in Table 9, the t-

statistic for FDIST was not significant.

When the Switch

group is restricted to clients that switched from one Big
Eight auditor to another, the

t-statistic for FDIST

increases to 2.10 (p-value = 0.03).
Differences between the groups for the dichotomous
independent variables were tested using the Chi-Square
test.

Results for clients of Big Eight auditors are

presented in Table 10.

The results are similar to those

for the sample as a whole. The clients of an industry
specialist were less likely to leave their auditor than
other clients.

Client firms with audit committees were

less likely to switch auditors than firms without such
committees.

The results were unchanged when the Switch

group was restricted to clients that switched from one Big
Eight auditor to another.
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TABLE 10

CHI-SQUARE TEST OF DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLES
Clients of Big Eight Auditors
STATE

In-State

Out of State

Totals

Switch

25

145

170

Non-Switch

25

177

202

Totals

50

322

372

Chi-Square (1 d.f.) = 0.430
p-value = 0 .511
SPEC

Specialist

Non-Specialist

Totals

Switch

42

128

170

Non-Switch

80

122

202

122

250

372

Totals

Chi-Square (1 d.f.) = 9.296
p-value = 0 .002
AUDCOM
Switch
Non-Switch
Totals

Committee

Totals

69

50

119

124

25

149

193

75

268

Chi-Square (1 d.f.) = 20.910
p-value < 0.001

No Committee
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TABLE 10-Continued

MB ONUS

Bonus Plan

No Bonus Plan_____ Totals

Switch

58

58

116

Non-Switch

75

68

143

126

259

Totals

133

Chi-Square (1 d.f.) =

0.153

p-value = 0.695
The univariate results for clients of Big Eight
auditors only were similar to those for the sample as a
whole.

To provide further insight into the results, a

logit model was estimated for the clients of Big Eight
auditors only.

Results are presented in Table 11.
TABLE 11

LOGIT MODEL RESULTS
Clients of Big Eight Auditors
Parameter
Hypothesis Variable Coefficient Chi-Square P--value
0.93
HI
-0.007
0.01
MOWN
0.55
0.45
MBONUS
0.253
H2
0.36
0.55
H3
DEBT
0.437
0.43
0.51
H4
NISSUE
0.381
< 0.01
H5
-0.531
20.16
SIZE*
H6
0.266
0.72
0.39
GROWTH*
0.06
H7
-0.748
3.48
AUDCOM
0.46
H8
FDIST
-0.002
0.54
1.47
0.22
H9
SPEC
-0.446
0.40
H10
0.387
0.70
STATE
< 0.01
16.32
5.582
Intercept
Model Chi-Square
* as measured in assets

53.56

< 0.01
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As was the case for the full sample (Table 8), the
only independent variable significant at the 0.05 level is
SIZE.

The most striking difference noted in Table 11 is

the increase in significance of the variable AUDCOM. The
coefficient of AUDCOM for the sample as a whole had a pvalue of 0.24.

The results in Table 12 show a

p-value

for AUDCOM of 0.06. The results reported in Table 11
employ the asset-based measures of SIZE and GROWTH.

No

significant differences were noted when the sales-based
measures were used.5
Concerns about multicollinearity call into question
the reliability of individual coefficients in the logit
model.

To gain more insight into the contribution of each

independent variable, a stepwise logit procedure was
employed.

Variables were added to the logit model

individually and retained if their coefficients were
significant at the 0.05 level.

Stepwise logit results are

presented in Table 12.

5 As a further analysis, the Switch group was
restricted to clients that changed from one Big Eight
auditor to another.
Logit model results using the assetbased measures of SIZE and GROWTH were not noticeably
different from the results reported in Table 11. When the
sales-based measures of SIZE and GROWTH were used for this
reduced Switch group, the variable AUDCOM had a
coefficient with a p-value of 0.11.
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TABLE 12

STEPWISE LOGIT RESULTS— CLIENTS OF BIG EIGHT AUDITORS
Parameter
Variable
Coefficient
Chi-Square
P-■Value
Asset-Based Measures of SIZE and GROWTH
< 0.01
30.98
SIZE
-0.581
< 0.01
27.38
Intercept
5.813

SIZE
GROWTH
AUDCOM

< 0. 01

42.60

Model Chi-Square

Sales-Based Measures of SIZE and GROWTH
< 0.01
18.20
-0.420
2.88
0.08
0.730
4.26
-0.753
0.03
< 0.02.

43.78

Model Chi-Square

The first section of Table 12 presents the results
of the stepwise logit model when total assets are used as
a measure of SIZE.

The results are consistent with the

prior logit models reported.

The only independent

variable with a significant coefficient is SIZE.

The

results are quite different when annual sales is used as a
measure of SIZE and GROWTH.

As is reported in the second

section of Table 12, both GROWTH and AUDCOM met the 0.05
significance level necessary to be retained in the model.6
Faster growing firms were more likely to switch auditors
after an SEC action against their auditor.

Firms with

6 Variables had to be significant at the 0.05
significance level to be retained in the model.
Once
included in the model, the level of their coefficients is
affected by the degree of correlation with other variables
in the model.
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audit committees were less likely to switch than firms
without committees.7
The analysis in Table 12 was repeated with the
Switch group restricted to clients that had switched from
one Big Eight auditor to another.
noted for the asset-based model.

No differences were
When annual sales was

used as a measure of SIZE and GROWTH, the variables SIZE
and GROWTH were significant for the reduced Switch group.
AUDCOM, however, was not significant.

When the model was

estimated with a 0.10 level of significance required for a
variable to be retained in the model, AUDCOM had a
significant coefficient, as did SIZE and GROWTH.
The multivariate analysis indicates differences
between clients of Big Eight auditors and the sample as a
whole.

In particular, the variables AUDCOM and GROWTH (as

measured by sales) are considerably more significant for
Big Eight clients than for all clients.

An examination of

clients of smaller auditors follows.
For this phase of the analysis, the Switch group was
restricted to clients of non-Big Eight auditors.

The

continuous independent variables were examined for
differences between the Switch and Non-Switch groups.

7 When the stepwise logit model employing the assetbased measures of SIZE and GROWTH was run using a 0.10
significance level required for a variable to remain in
the model, AUDCOM was significant (p-value 0.06) and was
retained in the model.
GROWTH in assets was not
significant.
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Univariate test results for the continuous independent
variables are presented in Table 13.
TABLE 13
UNIVARIATE RESULTS - CONTINUOUS VARIABLES
Clients of Non-Big Eight Auditors
Switch
Group

Variable
MOWN— mean
(std. dev.)
DEBT
NISSUE
SIZE— Assets
GROWTH— Assets
SIZE— Sales
GROWTH— Sales
FDIST

0.351
(0.214)
0.528
(0.322)
0.112
(0.288)
8.923
(1.875)
0.308
(0.548)
8.736
(2.183)
0.329
(1.068)
4.918
(9.053)

Non-Switch
Group
0.355
(0.219)
0.581
(0.457)
0.132
(0.425)
9.388
(1.969)
0.218
(0.470)
9.240
(2.338)
0.318
(0.871)
6.670
(16.514)

t-value

Mann-Whitney
z-value

“0.07*

0.07

-0.70

0.62

-0.25“

0.77

-1.36

1.75*

-0.80

0.68

1.16

1.36

0.04

0.47

-0.69

0.43

p-value < 0.10
* one tail test

The results in Table 13 are characterized by a lack
of significant differences for almost all variables.

Only

the asset-based measure of firm size is marginally
significant (p-value = 0.08) using the Mann-Whitney test
statistic.

The weak results for SIZE are especially

surprising given the consistency with which significant
results have been found in the earlier analyses.

To

further investigate the results in Table 13, the Switch
sample was restricted to clients that had changed from one

non-Big Eight auditor to another.

As noted earlier, this

procedure serves as a partial control for firms changing
auditors in response to their own evolving needs for
credibility, rather than in response to a change in the
credibility of their current auditors.

The results of

this procedure are presented in Table 14.
TABLE 14
UNIVARIATE TEST RESULTS - CONTINUOUS VARIABLES
Clients of Non-Big Eight Auditors
Reduced Sample
Variable

Switch
Grouo

Non-Switch
Mann-Wh itney
Grouo
t-value
z-value

MOWN— mean
(std. dev.)

0.391
(0.218)

0.355
(0.219)

0.49“

0.53

DEBT

0.531
(0.393)

0.581
(0.457)

-0.41

0.45

NISSUE

0.000
(0.000)

0.132
(0.430)

-1.36‘

0.69

SIZE— Assets

7.861
(1.095)

9.388
(1.969)

-4.37***

3.59***

GROWTH— Assets

0.489
(0.835)

0.218
(0.470)

1.09

SIZE— Sales

7.566
(1.374)

9.240
(2.338)

-3.59***

GROWTH— Sales

0.489
(1.711)

0.318
(0.871)

0.29

1.05

FDIST

4.632
(7.507)

6.670
(16.514)

-0.75

0.48

0.01
3.10***

p-value < 0.10
p-value < 0.05
p-value < 0.01
one tail test

When clients that switched from a smaller auditor to
a Big Eight auditor are excluded from the Switch group,
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the SIZE variable is significant for both measures of the
variable.

As was the case with the full sample of clients

of smaller auditors, no other significant differences were
noted.
The dichotomous independent variables were analyzed
using the Chi-Square test for independence of
classification.

The industry specialization variable

(SPEC) was not included in the analysis because non-Big
Eight firms were not large enough to specialize.

Table 15

presents the results of the Chi-Square tests.
TABLE 15
CHI-SQUARE TEST OF DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLES
Clients of Non-Big Eight Auditors
STATE

In-State

Out of State

Totals

Switch

12

40

52

Non-Switch

10

49

59

Totals

22

89

111

Chi-Square (1 d.f.) = 0.653
p-value = 0 .419

AUDCOM

Committee

No Committee

Totals

Switch

17

23

40

Non-Switch

21

22

43

Totals

38

45

83

Chi-Square (1 d.f.) = 0.335
p-value = 0.562
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TABLE 15-Continued

MBONUS

Bonus Plan

No Bonus Plan

Totals

Switch

13

30

43

Non-Switch

20

27

47

Totals

33

57

90

Chi-Square (ld.f.) =

1.467

p-value = 0.225
As for the sample as a whole, and for the. sample of
clients of Big Eight firms, STATE was not a significant
variable influencing the change in auditors.

The

existence of an audit committee, which was highly
significant for the full sample was not a significant
factor in Table 15.
was not significant.

Consistent with prior results, MBONUS
When clients that switched from a

smaller auditor to a Big Eight auditor were deleted from
the Switch group, the results were unchanged for MBONUS
and STATE.

The reduced Switch group did affect the

significance of the variable AUDCOM, however.
for this variable are presented in Table 16.

The results
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TABLE 16

CHI-SQUARE TEST OF DICHOTOMOUS VARIABLES
Clients of Non-Big Eight Auditors
Reduced Sample
AUDCOM

Committee

No Committee

Totals

1

13

14

Non-Switch

20

22

42

Totals

21

35

56

Switch

Chi-Square (1 d.f.) = 7.339
p-value = 0.006
As is shown in Table 16, firms with audit committees
were significantly less likely to switch auditors than
firms without such committees.

The significance of AUDCOM

is consistent with the Chi-Square results observed for the
sample as a whole, and for clients of Big Eight firms.
A logit model was estimated for the clients of
smaller auditors.

The absence of industry specialists

among non-Big Eight auditors necessitated the deletion of
the variable SPEC from the model.

Results are presented

in Table 17 for the model using the asset-based measures
of SIZE and GROWTH.
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TABLE 17

LOGIT MODEL RESULTS-CLIENTS OF NON-BIG EIGHT
AUDITORS
Parameter
Hypothesis Variable Coefficient Chi-Square p-value
0.27
MOWN
-2.103
1.18
HI
MBONUS
-1.730
4.56
0.03
H2
-2.550
1.52
0.21
H3
DEBT
0.97
NISSUE
-0.027
0.00
H4
-0.107
0.22
0.64
SIZE*
H5
0.38
1.361
0.74
H6
GROWTH*
0.54
AUDCOM
0.472
0.37
H7
0.13
FDIST
-0.243
2.23
H8
2.08
0.14
H10
STATE
1.583
1.42
0.23
Intercept
3.552
Model Chi- Square
* as measured in assets

11.72

0.22

The logit results for clients of smaller auditors
are quite different from the results of the previous
models. The coefficient of SIZE, as measured by assets, is
not significant.

The coefficient of MBONUS is significant

(p-value = 0.03) and negatively related to the probability
of a firm switching auditors after an SEC action.

The

variables STATE and FDIST, while not significant at
traditional levels of significance, have much lower pvalues than in previous models.

When the sales-based

measures of SIZE and GROWTH are used in the logit model,
the differences from prior results is even more striking.
Table 18 presents the results for this formulation of the
logit model.

76
TABLE 18

LOGIT MODEL RESULTS-CLIENTS OF NON-BIG EIGHT
AUDITORS
Sales-based Measures of SIZE and GROWTH
Parameter
Hypothesis Variable Coefficient Chi-Square p-value
0.18
MOWN
-0.872
0.67
HI
5.36
H2
MBONUS
-2.040
0.02
3.85
DEBT
-5.446
0.04
H3
0.09
-0.271
0.76
H4
NISSUE
-0.029
0.02
0.88
H5
SIZE*
1.466
3.99
0.04
H6
GROWTH*
0.35
0.55
H7
AUDCOM
0.492
5.03
0.02
FDIST
-0.543
H8
1.181
1.02
0.31
H10
STATE
Intercept
2.54
0.11
4.382
Model Chi- Square

14.36

0.11

* as measured in sales
The sales-based measure of GROWTH is significant (pvalue = 0.04), while the asset-based measure of GROWTH has
a p-value of 0.38.

Use of a different measure of SIZE and

GROWTH also affected the significance of the coefficients
of FDIST and DEBT. Neither was significant in the assetbased model reported in Table 17.

Both were significant

in the sales-based model reported in Table 18.

MBONUS had

a significant coefficient in both models.
Because of the difficulties in interpreting the
individual coefficients of the variables created by
correlations among the independent variables, a stepwise
logit model was employed.

As before, individual variables

were added to the model and retained if a significance
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level of 0.05 was met.

The results of the stepwise

procedure are reported in Table 19.
TABLE 19
STEPWISE LOGIT RESULTS— CLIENTS OF NON-BIG EIGHT AUDITORS
Parameter
Variable
Coefficient
Chi-Square
P-Value
Asset-Based Measures of SIZE and GROWTH
MBONUS
Intercept

-1.303
0.125

Model Chi-•Square

3.76
0.12

0.05
0.72

4.14

0.04

Sales-Based Measures of SIZE and GROWTH
MBONUS
Intercept

-1.317
0.064

Model Chi-•Square

3.85
0.03

0.04
0.85

4.25

0. 03

The results for the asset-based stepwise logit model
reported in Panel A of Table 19 are similar to those of
the model as a whole as reported in Table 17.

The results

for the sales-based stepwise logit model are quite
different from those reported for the full model in
18.

The variables FDIST, GROWTH,

Table

and DEBT, all

significant in the full model did

not meet the 0.05

significance level required for a

variable to be retained

in the model.

When the Switch group is restricted to

clients that did not change to a Big Eight auditor, AUDCOM
is significant at the 0.05 level (results not presented).
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Results of Hypothesis Tests
The results of the univariate and multivariate
tests, taken together, allow conclusions to be drawn about
the research hypotheses.

The results were characterized

by a divergence between t-test results and results of the
nonparametric Mann-Whitney test.

The high degrees of

skewness and kurtosis in the variables1 distributions
provide an explanation for this difference.

The

independent variables are highly correlated, suggesting
that the individual coefficients of the logit models are
unreliable indicators of a variable's significance.

The

correlations also provide an explanation for the
divergence between the univariate and multivariate
results.
The first hypothesis was that the smaller
management's ownership of the firm (MOWN), the higher the
probability that the firm would switch auditors following
an SEC action against the firm's auditor.

For the sample

as a whole the univariate test results revealed a
significant difference in the level of management
ownership between the Switch and Non-Switch groups.
Surprisingly, clients switching auditors had higher levels
of management ownership than clients that did not switch.
However, the logit model results indicated that MOWN was
not a significant variable, suggesting that the observed
differences in MOWN were due to that variable's high

degree of correlation with other factors, such as SIZE,
rather than to the influence of MOWN itself.

The same

pattern was found when the sample was restricted to
clients of Big Eight auditors.

When clients of Big Eight

auditors were examined separately, MOWN was not
significant in either the univariate or multivariate
tests.

Taken as a whole, the results do not support the

first hypothesis.
The second hypothesis was that firms with
accounting-based management compensation plans (MBONUS)
were more likely to switch auditors than firms without
such plans.

Chi-square and logit results were

consistently not significant for the full sample and
clients of Big Eight auditors.

When the sample of clients

of non-Big Eight auditors was examined, MBONUS had a
significant coefficient in the full logit model. The sign
of the coefficient was opposite the predicted sign,
however.

This result was supported by a stepwise logit

procedure, in which MBONUS met the significance level
required for it to be retained in the model.

The results

indicate that, for clients of smaller auditors, the
existence of an accounting-based bonus plan does affect
the likelihood of a firm switching auditors after an SEC
action against their external auditor.

Because of the

sign of the observed relationship, however, the second
hypothesis is not supported by the evidence.

A firm's debt position was addressed by the third
hypothesis, which held that firms switching auditors would
have a significantly different degree of leverage (DEBT)
than firms that did not switch auditors.

Nonparametric

test results showed that firms in the Switch group were
significantly more highly leveraged than firms in the NonSwitch group.

Results of logit analysis, however,

indicated that DEBT did not significantly affect the
probability of a firm switching auditors.

As was noted

with MOWN, the correlation of DEBT and SIZE may explain
the divergence between the univariate and multivariate
results.

For the sample as a whole, and for clients of

Big Eight auditors, the results do not support the third
hypothesis.

When the clients of smaller auditors were

examined separately, the univariate test results showed no
differences in leverage between the Switch and Non-Switch
groups.

The logit model using the sales-based measure of

SIZE and GROWTH contained a significant coefficient for
DEBT, but the results were not supported by the stepwise
logit procedure.

Given the unreliability of individual

coefficients due to correlation among the independent
variables, the significance of DEBT in one model does not
constitute strong evidence in support of the third
hypothesis.
The fourth hypothesis holds that a firm planning to
raise debt or equity in the capital markets (NISSUE) would
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be more likely to change auditors than a firm without such
financing plans.

As with all the continuous variables,

the Mann-Whitney test indicated a significant difference
between the Switch and Non-Switch groups.

This result was

not supported by the multivariate analysis, however.
Taken together, the results do not support the fourth
hypothesis.
The fifth and sixth hypotheses held that the Switch
and Non-Switch groups would differ in firm size and rate
of growth.

Two measures of size were employed— total

assets and annual sales.

Three year growth rates were

calculated using both measures.

For the sample as a whole

and for the clients of Big Eight auditors, the results
consistently showed that clients in the Switch group were
significantly smaller than clients in the Non-Switch
group.

However, clients of smaller auditors did not

significantly differ in SIZE between the two groups.

With

that exception, the evidence supports the fifth
hypothesis.
The significance of the variable GROWTH depended on
the measure used to calculate a firm's rate of growth.
The full model Mann-Whitney test statistics indicated that
firms switching auditors were growing at a faster rate
than firms in the Non-Switch group.

Results of the logit

model did not support this conclusion.

When the clients

of Big Eight auditors were examined separately, the

stepwise logit procedure revealed that the coefficient of
GROWTH as measured by sales was significant, while the
asset-based measure of GROWTH was not.

The univariate

test results for clients of smaller auditors revealed no
differences in growth rates between the Switch and nonSwitch groups.

The logit model indicated a significant

coefficient for the sales-based measure of GROWTH, but not
for the asset-based measure. Stepwise logit results for
the clients of non-Big Eight auditors failed to show a
significant result for either measure of GROWTH.

The

evidence fails to strongly support the sixth hypothesis.
Prior research had suggested that firms with
corporate audit committees (AUDCOM) were more likely to
change auditors than firms without such committees.

Chi-

square results indicated that the reverse relationship
existed.

Logit results for the clients of Big Eight

auditors also indicated that AUDCOM was significant. When
the sales-based stepwise logit model was employed, AUDCOM
was significant at the 0.05 significance level.

Chi-

square results indicated that the existence of a corporate
audit committee affected the probability of a client of a
smaller audit firm switching auditors.

Results of the

stepwise logit procedure for a sample of firms that had
switched from one non-Big Eight auditor to another
supported this finding.

Because the direction of the
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relationship is opposite that predicted, the evidence does
not support

the seventh hypothesis.

The eighth hypothesis postulated that firms of
differing degrees of financial health would respond
differently to changes in external auditor credibility.
FDIST was significantly correlated with SIZE, GROWTH,
NISSUE, and DEBT.

Although the univariate nonparametric

tests indicated significant differences between the Switch
and Non-Switch groups, the logit model results did not
consistently support this finding.

The evidence does not

appear to support the eighth hypothesis.
The ninth hypothesis held that firms would be less
likely to terminate a relationship with an auditor that
was a specialist in the firm's industry.

Chi-square tests

supported this hypothesis, but the logit results
consistently failed to show significance for the variable
SPEC.

The divergence in results may attributable to

SPEC's significant (p-value 0.01) correlation with SIZE.
The final independent variable focused on the
geographical component of credibility.

The tenth

hypothesis was that a firm would be more likely to change
auditors if the SEC action dealt with an audit failure in
that firm's state.
hypothesis.

No evidence was found to support this

Table 20 provides a summary of the results of

the hypothesis tests.
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TABLE 20

SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESIS TESTS
Variable
HI
H2
H3
H4
H5
H6
H7
H8
H9
H10

MOWN
MBONUS
DEBT
NISSUE
SIZE
GROWTH
AUDCOM
FDIST
SPEC
STATE

Description

Result

Management Ownership
Bonus Plan
Firm Leverage
New Issues of Equity/Debt
Firm Size
Three Year Rate of Growth
Audit Committee
Financial Health
Industry Specialist
Location of Client Firm

Not Significant
Significant*
Not Significant
Not Significant
Significant
Not Significantb
Significant'
Not Significant
Not Significant
Not Sianificant

* Significant for clients of non-Big Eight auditors with
sign opposite of that expected.
b Significant for clients of Big Eight auditors when
measured in sales.
c Significant with sign opposite of that expected.
Summary
This chapter has presented the results of the
univariate and multivariate tests.

Results were discussed

for the sample as a whole, and then separately for clients
of Big Eight auditors and clients of smaller auditors.
The following chapter will provide a discussion and
interpretation of these results.

Implications of the

findings and suggestions for future research will be
presented, along with a discussion of some limitations of
this study.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter will summarize and discuss the results
presented in the previous chapter.

The implications of

those results will be presented, followed by a discussion
of some of the limitations of this study.

The final

section of the chapter will present some suggestions for
future research.
Summary of Results and Implications
The single most significant variable in the sample
as a whole was SIZE.

In the sample as a whole and for

clients of Big Eight auditors, firms in the Switch group
were significantly smaller than firms in the Non-Switch
group.

The results seem to support the view that the

demand for a credible auditor is a function of the amount
of information available about the firm.

As noted by

Wilson and Grimlund (1990), financial statements make up a
larger portion of a small firm's information set, and thus
the credibility of those financial statements may be a
more important consideration than it would be for a larger
firm.
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When the clients of Big Eight auditors and clients
of smaller auditors were examined separately, several
differences emerged.

While firm size was also an

important variable for clients of Big Eight auditors, it
was not significant for the clients of smaller auditors.
Among clients of Big Eight firms, firms with faster rates
of sales growth were more likely to switch auditors.
Strong evidence of such a trend among clients of smaller
auditors was not found.
Clients of Big Eight auditors with corporate audit
committees were significantly less likely to switch
auditors after an SEC action against their auditor than
firms without such committees.

For clients of smaller

auditors, the existence of an audit committee seemed to be
a significant factor only for those firms switching from
one non-Big Eight auditor to another.

This result appears

to be inconsistent with the findings of Lynn (1985) , whose
survey of firms revealed auditor prestige to be more
important to firms with audit committees.
Two factors may explain the reluctance of firms with
audit committees to switch auditors.

First, the existence

of an audit committee may create another layer of
bureaucracy within the corporation.

Additional

evaluations and discussions at another decision making
level within the firm may make it more difficult for firms
to change auditors in response to a single event, such as
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an SEC Rule 2(e) action against the firm's auditor.

Firms

without such committees may find the decision making
process more "streamlined," and thus switch auditors more
easily.
A second explanation for firms with audit committees
being less likely to switch auditors affected by SEC
actions may be the role of the committee in the auditor
selection process.

An independent audit committee may be

able to more carefully evaluate the firm's auditors.

The

increased level of scrutiny may cause the audit committee
to be influenced less by events not directly involving the
firm, such as SEC actions against the firm's auditor.
The existence of an accounting-based bonus plan was
not a significant factor in the analysis of clients of Big
Eight auditors.

This was the single most significant

variable for clients of smaller auditors, however.

Among

this sample subset, firms with a bonus plan were less
likely to switch auditors than firms without such a plan.
This finding is contrary to the hypothesized relationship.
The other variables hypothesized to have an impact
on the probability of a firm switching auditors were not
consistently significant.

This was true for variables

suggested by agency theory (MOWN, NISSUE, DEBT) and
variables suggested by prior research (FDIST, SPEC,
STATE).

No differences were noted between the Switch and

Non-Switch groups for these variables..
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Perhaps the most compelling result is the apparent
failure of agency theory to correctly predict the observed
relationships.

The results for SIZE and MBONUS were

contrary to what would have been expected under agency
theory.

Other agency theory derived variables (MOWN’,

NISSUE, DEBT) were not significant in this study.
Although agency theory has been used to analyze firms
changing auditors due to their evolving needs for auditor
credibility, its predictions have yielded mixed results.
An example of the predictive ability of agency
theory in the auditor choice literature is the level of
management ownership of the firm.

Agency theory predicts

that firms with higher levels of management ownership have
less need for credible auditing (Francis and Wilson 1988).
Palmrose (1984) tested the degree of management ownership
as a factor affecting the probability that a firm
switching auditors would select a Big Eight auditor.

No

significant result was found. Similar results were
reported by Francis and Wilson (1988).

Eichenseher and

Shields (1989) found management ownership positively
associated with the switch to a Big Eight auditor, a
result contrary to their prediction derived from agency
theory.
Although Francis and Wilson (1988) found that
changes in some agency cost derived variables were
significant in predicting auditor choice, the results of
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this study and others indicate that agency theory does
fully capture the factors affecting a firm's selection of
an auditor.

As Francis and Wilson (1988, 680) note:

While agency costs appear, at the margin, to affect
auditor choice above and beyond client size/growth,
the auditor selection process seems to be more complex
than modelled in this and related studies.
The SEC has been criticised for its approach to
disciplinary actions against auditors under Rule 2(e).
Business Week (1984, 132) noted the perception that
". . .

such an action has a disproportionate effect on

smaller firms . . . ."

The SEC may be subject to this

criticism because of its lack of knowledge about the
impact of its actions on audit firms.

The results of this

study should provide the SEC with information about the
consequences of a Rule 2(e) action against an auditor.
The knowledge that different factors affect the response
of clients of Big Eight firms and clients of smaller
auditors should allow the SEC to more fully assess the
punitive impact of its actions against auditors under Rule
2(e).

As more insight is gained into the consequences of

a Rule 2(e) action, the SEC will be able to better
determine when such an action is an appropriate regulatory
response in dealing with audit firms.

Evidence of

disparate impact upon audit firms of different sizes may
cause the SEC to consider alternate disciplinary
procedures for smaller audit firms.

The results of this research also have implications
for audit firms.

Knowledge of the factors influencing a

client's decision to switch auditors following events that
adversely affect auditor credibility will allow auditors
to more accurately assess the costs of such events.

With

a better understanding of the costs of a decline in
credibility, auditors will be better equipped to determine
the optimal level of resources allocated to maintaining
audit quality and minimizing the chances of a credibility
reducing event.

For example, the results of this study

suggest that an auditor with a client base composed of
smaller firms has a greater need to avoid events that
reduce credibility than an auditor that serves larger
client firms.
Knowledge of which clients are most sensitive to
changes in auditor credibility should benefit auditors
that have experienced a decline in credibility.

These

auditors should be able to maximize the effectiveness of
efforts to retain existing clients and attract new ones.
An understanding of what factors influence a client to
switch auditors will allow the auditor to identify the
client firms most likely to leave for another auditor.
Identification of these "at risk" clients will allow the
auditor to better target its efforts as it seeks to
minimize the adverse effects of a loss of credibility.
An auditor seeking to attract new clients after a decline
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in credibility will be able to identify those firms which
are most likely to enter into a relationship with the
auditor.

Time and resources would then be used in

attempts to attract those clients, rather than clients
whose characteristics indicate little chance of success.
Limitations
The study has several limitations that may affect
the interpretation of the observed results.

First is the

implicit assumption of this study that SEC actions under
Rule 2(e) are events that adversely affect auditor
credibility.

Although such an assumption is based on

prior research (Wilson and Grimlund 1990), if SEC actions
do not affect auditor credibility the results of this
study are difficult to interpret.
A second limitation is the assumption that all SEC
actions were equally damaging to auditor credibility.

A

review of the SEC actions used in the study revealed no
evident differences in the severity of the penalties
imposed on the auditors involved.

However, the impact of

SEC actions on credibility may be affected by factors such
as the publicity surrounding the SEC action, or of the
alleged audit failure that triggered the SEC action.

To

the extent that these factors created differences in the
impact of the SEC actions, the results of this study are
confounded.
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The third limitation is the probability that the
Switch group includes firms that would have switched
auditors whether or not the SEC had acted against their
auditor.

An attempt was made to partially control for

this possibility by deleting from the Switch group firms
that had switched from one level of auditor to another.
To the extent this procedure did not control for auditor
switching unrelated to SEC actions inferences about the
results of this study are clouded.
A fourth limitation of the study is the attempt to
capture complex constructs with relatively simple
measures.

For example, the geographical nature of

reaction to changes in auditor credibility, the incentives
of managers with accounting-based bonus plans, and effects
of a corporate audit committee are all measured with
dichotomous variables.

To the extent that the measures

employed do not correctly measure their underlying
constructs, the inferences that can be drawn from the
results are clouded.
A fifth limitation is the reliance of the study on
publicly available information.

If the decision to change

auditors is based on non-public information, then this
study's results and conclusions are incomplete.

An

example of non-public information that may have affected
the results is the existence of multi-year audit
contracts.

Clients entering into such contracts may be
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unable to switch auditors, even though they would switch
in the absence of such a contract.

The existence of

multi-year audit contracts and other non-public
information are factors confounding the results of this
study.
Another possible limitation relates to
interpretation of the results of the variable AUDCOM.
Firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange have been
required to have audit committees since 1978.

Firms

traded in the over-the-counter market have recently been
required to form audit committees.

Audit committees are

optional for firms listed on other exchanges.

Pincus,

Rubarsky, and Wong (1989) document the evolution of
requirements for audit committees, as well as the increase
in voluntary formation of audit committees in the 1970s
and 1980s.
This study exeimines events which occur over a period
of time coinciding with a large increase in the number of
firms with corporate audit committees.

Although each

client firm included in the sample was matched with
another client firm from the same time period and from the
same auditor, the possibility

exists that the changes in

exchange listing requirements or other factors influencing
the formation of audit committees may affect the results.
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Suggestions for Future Research
The observed differences between clients of Big
Eight auditors and clients of smaller auditors suggest
that the nature of the demand for auditor credibility is
more complex than has been developed in the accounting
literature to date.

The failure of agency theory to

effectively model a firm's response to declines in
external auditor credibility supports this view.

Future

research could develop and explore alternative theories of
the demand for auditor credibility.
Most accounting research to date has assumed that
auditor credibility is a constant, and has examined
clients' changing demands for auditor credibility.
Missing from the accounting literature is an examination
of the forces that change credibility over time.

An

avenue for future research would be an analysis of the
intertemporal aspects of auditor credibility.
Third, the current research could be extended to
other events that possibly affect auditor credibility.
Litigation against auditors might be examined to determine
its impact on auditor credibility.

Other regulatory

actions could also be examined for evidence of adverse
effects due to declines in credibility.
A fourth direction for future research is suggested
by the findings of this study regarding audit committees.
A better understanding of the role of the audit committee

in the firm and its effect on the firm's decision making
processes is needed.

Future research could more closely

examine whether the existence of a corporate audit
committee does, in fact, inhibit auditor switching.
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